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
DEC 4 1978 OLC #78-23/3/A

Respectfully referred to:

Central Intelligence Agency Congressional Section Washington, D. C.

Return attn: Marie Steele 253 Russell Senate Bldg.

Because of the desire of this office to be responsive to all inquiries and communications, your consideration of the attached is requested. Your findings and views, in duplicate form, along with return of the enclosure, will be appreciated by



Form #2

HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR., N.J., CHAIRMAN

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 12, 1978

STEPHEN J. PARADISE, GENERAL COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR MARJORIE M. WHITTAKER, CHIEF CLERK

25X1

Thank you for your letter requesting information on a report you title "Hypnosis in Interrogation". I am sorry for the extreme delay in getting back to you on this matter.

The CIA informs me that they cannot locate a report by this title. On the outside chance that it may have been done by another agency, the Congressional Research Service was contacted. All the library's standard reference sources have been checked and they are unable to identify a report by this title.

If you should have any further information or a more detailed title of this report, please contact my office and we will be most happy to try and obtain a copy for your personal use.

> Richard S. Schweiker United States Senator

Please see the ottached Xerox sheet.
This is a DECLASSIFIED report, and is
obviously available. Will you please STAT

oproved For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP81M00980R000300010043-1

# Approyed For Release 2004/09/03 : CIA-RDP81Mg0980R000800010083-1

President Carter took office last January, the issue of human rights has ne a key and controversial element of U.S. foreign policy. But the problem ign't w with the Carter Administration, as a series of recently declassified memoranda reveals. In fact, Secretary of State Dean Rusk was burdened by this same question—specifically with respect to the still-simmering issue of apartheid in South Africa.

A State Department airgram entitled, "U.S. Overseas Internal Desense Policy-South Africa" and dated June 1962, spells out American policy regarding apartacid: "We do not intend to desist from a criticism of South Africa's racial policies, both because we consider those policies dangerous and short-sighted and because we regard it as essential for our overall policy in Africa to remain in step with wider African opinion." But, it adds, the "U.S. must distinguish between non-cooperation in matters directly or indirectly related to South Africa's apartheid, and cooperation in other important fields."

A year later, however, in the wake of a well-coordinated and highly successful black African Conference, G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, recommended a full embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa. "In African opinion," he said, "we can no longer rest our case on a condemnation of

apartheid. We must back it with meaningful action."

In opposition, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson, while agreeing that the present policy was "probably not entirely

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satisfactory," argued that it at least "gives us some flexibility and enables us to adapt our policy to changing circumstances." Anyway, Johnson claimed, any arms embargo would be ineffective unless all Western arm suppliers would agree to it, and that seemed unlikely.

In a reply, Dean Rusk explained that the memoranda raised some far-reaching questions which ought to be considered "within a broader framework of policy than that relating to the independent states of Africa." "At the heart of the issue," he continued, "is how we relate to those countries whose internal arrangements and practices are not only foreign to our own way of thinking but, in many cases,

repugnant to us."

While agreeing that the U.S. should use its influence in the direction of the principles to which its society is committed, Rusk believed that it was another matter to extend such influence into the field of sanctions and into actions which, if consistently applied, would interrupt U.S. relations with half of the existing community of states. He drew a sharp distinction between "our deep concern with respect to racial discrimination in the United States and the way in which we crusade on that very issue outside the United States. No one has elected to undertake such responsibilities in other countries. The President has reminded us that we are not interested in Pax Americana."

# Who Gets U. S. Nuclear Know-How?

How does the U.S. Government decide to whom it should make available nuclear information?

According to three declassified SECRET Defense Department reports prepared for President Kennedy's Paris meeting with de Gaulle, the U.S. had established separate policies for the U.K., France, and Germany by 1961. The U.K. was "authorized to receive atomic information for military applications." However, France was not so fortunate; it was denied access to strategic ballistic missile information ifter March, 1960, even though, as one eport estimated, it might cost the rench \$500 million to develop a elivery vehicle on its own.

justifications for the U.S. failure to cooperate. DOD argued, for example, that if it furnished this technology to France, the U.S. could not fall back of its non-proliferation policy an discouraging a German nuclfar program; such a program would, in the Defense view, threaten NATO and increase the chance of nuclear twar. Another reason for refusing the Fench information was DOD's mistrust of de Gaulle, who might make an agreement to commit France's nuclear force to NATO in exchange for ballistic nassile technology from the U.S., but who, nevertheless, "would not hesitate to use or withhold France's NATO-committed nuclear force for national reasons, however great the resulting damage to

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NEWS . . .

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#### CHALDOCUMENTS SHOW SOME NUCLEAR PLOAT ACCIDENTS

Two recently-leleased, heavily-SANITIZE CIA Information Reports lend of edence to allegations by defecting Soviet scientists of accidents at Soviet nuclear installations in the Ural mountails.

One report dated March 4, 1959, provides information on an unspecified accident at the Kasli

atomic plant on the eastern slopes of the Urals in the swinter of 1957. Stores in nearby Kamensk-Uralskiy were closed and food was trucked into the region.

A later report, dated February 16, 1961, contains additional information on nuclear plant disasters in the region.

An "accident" in a plant operating near Kyshtym (70 kilometers northwest of Chelvabinsk) had reportedly Chelyabinsk) had reportedly contaminated large areas of land around it by 1958. People living in the region considered the water in lakes and rivers a health hazard. Food grown locally was inspected in Chelyabinsk. Travelers to Kyshtym until 1958 "were checked at the Kyshtym railway station, and nobody could enter the town without a special permit."
Contaminated villages were reportedly burned, and their inhabitants relocated, carrying away only the clothes they had on their backs. The plant responsible "was probably processing radioactive deposits found in the Uran among which were huge deposits of zirconium," according to the report

## The CIA and Hypnosis

Will hypnosis help elicit information from persons under interrogation?

In a just-released report, "Hypnosis in Interrogation," the CIA looks at the nature of hypnosis and how it works on interrogees. - It examines the accuracy of information obtained in this way and discusses hypnosis as an interrogation aid,